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Abstract. In this paper we deal with machine learning 
methods and algorithms applied in learning simple 
concepts by their refining or explication. The method of 
refining a simple concept of an object O consists in 
discovering a molecular concept that defines the same 
or a very similar object to the object O. Typically, such a 
molecular concept is a professional definition of the 
object, for instance a biological definition according to 
taxonomy, or legal definition of roles, acts, etc. Our 
background theory is Transparent Intensional Logic 
(TIL). In TIL concepts are explicated as abstract 
procedures encoded by natural language terms. These 
procedures are defined as six kinds of TIL constructions. 
First, we briefly introduce the method of learning with a 
supervisor that is applied in our case. Then we describe 
the algorithm ‘Framework’ together with heuristic 
methods applied by it. The heuristics is based on a 
plausible supply of positive and negative (near-miss) 
examples by which learner’s hypotheses are refined and 
adjusted. Given a positive example, the learner refines 
the hypothesis learnt so far, while a near-miss example 
triggers specialization. Our heuristic methods deal with 
the way refinement is applied, which includes also its 
special cases generalization and specialization. 
Keywords. Machine learning, supervisor, transparent 
intensional logic, TIL, refinement, generalization, 
specialization, hypothesis, heuristics. 
1 Introduction 
The method of supervised machine learning 
enables the agents in a multi-agent system to 
adjust their ontology and increase their knowledge. 
In [13] the method has been applied to learning the 
concept of a property that classifies geometric 
figures such as lancet arches. 
In this paper we deal with natural language 
processing, which is an interdisciplinary discipline 
involving linguistics, logic and computer science. 
The goal of this paper is to describe the application 
of machine learning methods in agents’ learning 
simple concepts by their refinement or explication. 
Refinement is rigorously defined below. Briefly, by 
refining a simple concept of an object O, we mean 
discovering a molecular concept that defines the 
same object O. In mathematics we use definitions 
like “a group is a set G equipped with a binary 
operation that combines any two elements of G to 
form another element of G in such a way that group 
axioms are satisfied, namely associativity, 
existence of the neutral element in G and 
invertibility.”  
Here the simple concept to be refined is that of 
a ‘group’. The molecular concept refining ‘group’ is 
encoded by the right side of the definition, namely 
‘a set G equipped with a binary operation that 
combines any two elements of G to form another 
element of G in such a way that group axioms are 
satisfied, namely associativity, existence of the 
neutral element in G and invertibility’. In case of 
empirical concepts, it is more plausible to speak 
about explication. The reason is this.  
To say that a molecular concept C is a 
refinement of a simple empirical concept D is risky. 
It would be a refinement only if the molecular 
concept C was equivalent to the original concept 
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D, which means that both are the concepts of the 
same object O.  
However, in the most interesting cases of 
empirical concepts of PWS-intensions we use a 
Carnapian explication rather than a definition 
proper, and then equivalence is surely not 
guaranteed.1 Rather, a new molecular concept C 
(explicatum) should define an object O that is as 
close as possible to the object referred to by an 
inexact prescientific concept D (explicandum). In 
Meaning and Necessity (1947), Carnap 
characterizes explication as follows: 
The task of making more exact a vague or not 
quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an 
earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or 
rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more 
exact concept, belongs among the most important 
tasks of logical analysis and logical construction. 
We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an 
explication for, the earlier concept [1], (pp. 7-8) 
Keeping this difference in mind, in this paper we 
use the term ‘refinement’ for both cases, including 
explication of empirical concepts, because in our 
sample example of explicating the concept of 
myopia this simplification is harmless.  
Our background theory is Transparent 
Intensional Logic (TIL) with its procedural (as 
opposed to set-theoretical) semantics. In TIL we 
explicate concepts procedurally. They are abstract 
structured procedures assigned to natural 
language terms as their meanings. In this way 
structured meanings are formalized in a fine-
grained way as so-called TIL constructions so that 
almost all the semantically salient features can be 
successfully dealt with. 
To this end we use the so-called Normal 
Translation Algorithm (NTA) that processes text 
data and produces TIL constructions as their 
                                                     
1  As an example, consider the simple concept of a planet. 
Which property falls under this concept? For sure, it is a 
property of individuals such that being a celestial body is a 
requisite of the property. Necessarily, if any individual x 
happens to be a planet, then x is a celestial body. However, 
which are the other requisites? One of the results of IAU 
2006 General Assembly in Prague was the resolution 5A on 
‘Definition of Planet’. A ‘planet’ was defined as a celestial 
body that (a) is in orbit around the Sun, (b) has sufficient 
mass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that 
it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round) shape, 
meanings.2 Having a meaning procedure, we can 
apply logic to prove what is entailed by it, compute 
the object (if any) produced by the procedure, deal 
with its structure, etc.  
However, there is a problem of understanding 
simple or atomic concepts that are expressed by 
semantically simple terms like ‘cat’, ‘dog’, ‘myopia’, 
etc. They are basic ‘building blocks’ of molecular 
concepts, and as such they are formalized just by 
the simplest procedure Trivialization of a given 
object O, ‘0O’ in symbols, that refers to the object 
O and makes it available to other molecular 
procedures to operate on it. In proof-theoretic 
semantics the meaning of atomic terms is given by 
the rules that determine how to use them in 
proofs. 3  This works well in the language of 
mathematics and logic.  
However, in natural language the ‘meaning as 
proof’ semantics is much less successful. For 
these reasons we decided to apply supervised 
machine learning methods.  
The issue is this. When processing a natural 
language text, our agents learn structured TIL 
procedures encoded by sentences. For instance, 
the sentence “Tom has myopia” translates into the 
TIL procedure wt [0Myopiawt  0Tom]. 
It can be viewed as an instruction how in any 
possible world (w) and time (t) evaluate the truth-
conditions of the sentence, which consists of 
these steps: 
– Take the individual Tom: 0Tom 
– Take the property of having Myopia: 0Myopia 
– Extensionalize the property with respect to 
world w and time t of evaluation: 0Myopiawt  
– Produce a truth-value by checking whether 
Tom has this property at the world w and time 
t of evaluation: [0Myopiawt 0Tom] 
and (c) has cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit. Is 
this definition a refinement of the original concept of a 
planet? No, it is just an explication. As a secondary result, it 
also decided that the modifier ‘dwarf’ is privative with respect 
to ‘planet’ (see [5]); a dwarf planet like Pluto is not a planet. 
For details see, IAU International Astronomical Union 0603 
Press Release: 
https://www.iau.org/news/pressreleases/detail/iau0603/ 
2 For details, see [10], [12]. 
3 See, for instance, [9]. 
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So far so good. We can derive that somebody 
has myopia, but this piece of information does not 
suffice to derive, for instance, that Tom has 
problems with impaired vision, needs negative 
dioptre correction, etc.  
We need to refine the simple concept 0Myopia 
to learn in more details what ‘myopia’ is. In other 
words, we want to define the property of having 
myopia. To this end we try to extract from natural 
language texts the collection of so-called requisites 
that together define the property. Hence, the 
supervisor looks for sentences like “Myopia (also 
called near-sightedness) is the most common 
cause of impaired vision in people under age 40”. 
Based on this piece of information the agent makes 
a hypothesis that among the requisites of myopia 
there are ‘near-sightedness’ and ‘impaired vision’.  
This is a positive example. Furthermore, we can 
read sentences like “Myopia is not caused by nerve 
trauma; rather, it occurs when the eyeball is too 
long, relative to the focusing power of the cornea 
and lens of the eye. This causes light rays to focus 
at a point in front of the retina, rather than directly 
on its surface. Near-sightedness also can be 
caused by the cornea and/or lens being too curved 
for the length of the eyeball. In some cases, 
myopia is due to a combination of these factors.” 
The supervisor should extract a negative example 
that myopia is not caused by nerve trauma and a 
collection of positive examples like ‘too long 
eyeball’, ‘wrong focusing’, etc.  
The algorithm of the learning process is based 
on such positive and negative examples. Given a 
positive example, the hypotheses are adjusted so 
that concepts of other requisites or typical 
properties are inserted. Negative (also ‘near-miss’) 
examples serve to the adjustment of the 
hypothesis (learnt so far) by specialization that 
excludes non-plausible elements. As a special 
case of refinement, we can also apply 
generalization. This is the case of inserting a more 
general concept in addition to some special 
constituents of the hypothesis. For instance, the 
degree of myopia is described in terms of the 
power of the ideal correction, which is measured 
in dioptres.  
Now the agent can extract information like this. 
“Low myopia usually describes myopia of -3.00 
dioptres or less (i.e. closer to 0.00), moderate 
myopia is between -3.00 and -6.00 dioptres, and 
high myopia is the degree -6.00 or more.” By 
generalization we obtain information that myopia is 
corrected by negative dioptres.The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows.  
In Section 2 we summarize foundations of TIL 
to describe logical machinery that we need in the 
rest of the paper. Section 3 introduces the 
principles of supervised machine learning. In 
Section 4 we deal with heuristic methods that are 
used to adjust and enrich agents’ knowledge base. 
In Section 5, an example of using the algorithm of 
machine learning together with TIL formalization is 
adduced. Finally, concluding remarks can be found 
in Section 6. 
2 Foundations of Transparent 
Intensional Logic (TIL) 
Since the TIL logical system has been introduced 
in numerous papers and two books, see, for 
instance [2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 17], here we just briefly 
summarise the main principles of a TIL fragment 
that we need for the purposes of this paper.  
TIL is a partial, typed hyperintensional lambda 
calculus with procedural as opposed to set-
theoretical denotational semantics. The terms of 
the TIL language denote abstract procedures that 
produce set-theoretical mappings (functions-in-
extension) or lower-order procedures. These 
procedures are rigorously defined as TIL 
constructions. Being procedural objects, 
constructions can be executed in order to operate 
on input objects (of a lower-order type) and 
produce the object (if any) they are typed to 
produce, while non-procedural objects, i.e. non-
constructions, cannot be executed. There are two 
atomic constructions that present input objects to 
be operated on. 
They are Trivialization and Variables. The 
operational sense of Trivialization is similar to that 
of constants in formal languages. Trivialization 
presents an object X without the mediation of any 
other procedures. Using the terminology of 
programming languages, the Trivialization of X, 
‘0X’ in symbols, is just a pointer that refers to X. 
Variables produce objects dependently on 
valuations; they v-construct. We adopt an objectual 
variant of the Tarskian conception of variables. To 
each type countably many variables are assigned 
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that range over this particular type. Objects of each 
type can be arranged into infinitely 
many sequences. 
The valuation v selects one such sequence of 
objects of the respective type, and the first variable 
v-constructs the first object of the sequence, the 
second variable v-constructs the second object of 
the sequence, and so on. Thus, the execution of a 
Trivialization or a variable never fails to produce an 
object. However, the execution of some of the 
molecular constructions can fail to present an 
object of the type they are typed to produce. When 
this happens, we say that such constructions 
are  v-improper. 
There are two dual molecular constructions, 
which correspond to -abstraction and application 
in -calculi, namely Closure and Composition.  
(-)Closure, [x1…xn X], transforms into the very 
procedure of producing a function by abstracting 
over the values of the variables x1, …, xn. The 
Closure [λx1…xm Y] is not v-improper for any 
valuation v, as it always v-constructs a function. 
Composition, [X X1…Xn], is the very procedure of 
applying a function produced by the procedure X 
to the tuple-argument (if any) produced by the 
procedures X1, …, Xn. While Closure never fails to 
produce a function, Composition is v-improper if 
one or more of its constituents X, X1, …, Xn are 
v- improper.  
This happens when a partial function f is applied 
to an argument a such that the function f is not 
defined at a. Another cause of improperness can 
be type-theoretical incoherence of the 
Composition. For instance, the proposition that the 
number 5 is a student does not have a truth-value 
at any world w and time t of evaluation, because 
the property of being a student is the property of 
individuals rather than numbers. Hence the 
application of the (extensionalized) property of 
being a student to the number 5 in a particular 
world w and time t of evaluation, in symbols 
[[[0Student w]t] 05], or [0Studentwt 05] for short, is v-
improper for every valuation v of the variables w 
(ranging over possible worlds) and t (ranging 
over times).  
In what follows we define six kinds of TIL 
constructions, and afterwards the ramified 
hierarchy of types into which objects of TIL 
ontology are organised.  
Definition (Constructions) 
(i) Variables x, y, are constructions that 
construct objects (elements of their 
respective ranges) dependently on a 
valuation v; they v-construct. 
(ii) Where X is an object whatsoever (even a 
construction), 0X is the construction 
Trivialization that constructs X without any 
change of X. 
(iii) Let X, Y1, …, Yn be arbitrary constructions. 
Then Composition [X Y1…Yn] is the following 
construction. For any v, the Composition [X 
Y1…Yn] is v-improper if at least one of the 
constructions X, Y1, …, Yn is v-improper by 
failing to v-construct anything, or if X does 
not v-construct a function that is defined at 
the n-tuple of objects v-constructed by 
Y1,…,Yn. If X does v-construct such a 
function, then [X Y1…Yn] v-constructs the 
value of this function at the n-tuple.  
(iv) (-) Closure [λx1…xm Y] is the following 
construction. Let x1, x2, …, xm be pair-wise 
distinct variables and Y a construction. Then 
[λx1…xm Y] v-constructs the function f that 
takes any members B1, …, Bm of the 
respective ranges of the variables x1, …, xm 
into the object (if any) that is 
v(B1/x1,…,Bm/xm)-constructed by Y, where 
v(B1/x1,…,Bm/xm) is like v except for 
assigning B1 to x1, …, Bm to xm. 
(v) Where X is an object whatsoever, 1X is the 
construction Single Execution that v-
constructs what X v-constructs. Thus, if X is 
a v-improper construction or not a 
construction as all, 1X is v-improper. 
(vi) Where X is an object whatsoever, 2X is the 
construction Double Execution. If X is not 
itself a construction, or if X does not v-
construct a construction, or if X v-constructs 
a v-improper construction, then 2X is v-
improper. Otherwise 2X v-constructs what is 
v-constructed by the construction v-
constructed by X.   
(vii) Nothing is a construction, unless it so follows 
from (i) through (vi).  
With constructions of constructions, 
constructions of functions, functions, and 
functional values in our stratified ontology, we need 
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to keep track of the traffic between multiple logical 
strata. The ramified type hierarchy does just that. 
The type of first-order objects includes all objects 
that are not constructions. Therefore, it includes 
not only the standard objects of individuals, truth-
values, sets, etc., but also functions defined on 
possible worlds (i.e., the intensions germane to 
possible-world semantics). The type of second-
order objects includes constructions of first-order 
objects and functions that have such constructions 
in their domain or range. The type of third-order 
objects includes constructions of first- and second-
order objects and functions that have such 
constructions in their domain or range. And so on, 
ad infinitum. 
Definition (types of order n). Let B be a base, 
where a base is a collection of pair-wise disjoint, 
non-empty sets. Then: 
T1 (types of order 1).  
i) Every member of B is an elementary type 
of order 1 over B. 
ii) Let α, β1, ..., βm (m > 0) be types of order 1 
over B. Then the collection (α β1 ... βm) of 
all m-ary partial mappings from β1  ...  
βm into α is a functional type of order 1 
over B. 
iii) Nothing is a type of order 1 over B unless 
it so follows from (i) and (ii). 
Cn (constructions of order n)  
i) Let x be a variable ranging over a type of 
order n. Then x is a construction of order n 
over B. 
ii) Let X be a member of a type of order n. 
Then 0X, 1X, 2X are constructions of order 
n over B.  
iii) Let X, X1, ..., Xm (m > 0) be constructions 
of order n over B. Then [X X1... Xm] is a 
construction of order n over B. 
iv) Let x1, ..., xm, X (m > 0) be constructions of 
order n over B. Then [x1...xm X] is a 
construction of order n over B. 
v) Nothing is a construction of order n over B 
unless it so follows from Cn (i)-(iv).   
Tn+1 (types of order n + 1)   
Let n be the collection of all constructions of 
order n over B. Then 
i) n and every type of order n are types of 
order n + 1.  
ii) If m > 0 and , 1, ..., m are types of order 
n + 1 over B, then ( 1 ... m) (see T1 ii)) is 
a type of order n + 1 over B. 
iii) Nothing is a type of order n + 1 over B 
unless it so follows from (i) and (ii).  
Remark. For the purposes of the analysis of our 
sample example of agents’ learning the concept of 
myopia intensional fragment of TIL based on the 
simple types of order 1 suffices. Yet when the 
agents learn new concepts, they enrich their 
ontology by new constructions that are just 
displayed rather than executed. To this end, the full 
ramified hierarchy is needed. For details see, 
e.g., [7, 8]. 
For the purposes of natural-language analysis, 
we are usually assuming the following base of 
elementary types: 
: the set of truth-values {T, F}; 
:  the set of individuals (the universe of 
discourse); 
:  the set of real numbers (doubling as times); 
:  the set of logically possible worlds (the 
logical space).  
We model sets and relations by their 
characteristic functions. Thus, for instance, () is 
the type of a set of individuals, while () is the 
type of a relation-in-extension between individuals. 
Empirical expressions denote empirical conditions 
that may or may not be satisfied at the world/time 
pair selected as points of evaluation. We model 
these empirical conditions as possible-world-
semantic intensions. Intensions are entities of type 
(): mappings from possible worlds to an arbitrary 
type . The type  is frequently the type of the 
chronology of -objects, i.e., a mapping of type 
(). Thus -intensions are usually functions of 
type (()), abbreviated as ‘’. Extensional 
entities are entities of a type  where   () for 
any type .  
Hence, empirical expressions denote (non-
trivial, i.e. non-constant) intensions. Where 
variable w ranges over  and t over , the following 
logical form essentially characterizes the logical 
syntax of empirical language:  
wt […w….t…]. 
Examples of frequently used intensions are:  
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– propositions of type  denoted by sentences 
like “John is a student”;  
– properties of individuals of type () denoted 
by nouns and adjectives, e.g. ‘student’, ‘red’, 
‘tall’, ‘myopia’, ‘near-sighted’;  
– binary relations-in-intension between 
individuals of type (), e.g. being 
‘composed of’, ‘to like’; 
– individual offices (or roles) of type  that are 
denoted by definite descriptions like ‘the 
tallest mountain’, ‘Miss World 2019’, ‘the 
President of Zanzibar’.  
Logical objects like truth-functions and are 
extensional:  (conjunction),  (disjunction) and  
(implication) are of type (), and  (negation) of 
type (). The quantifiers ,  are type-
theoretically polymorphic total functions of type 
(()), for an arbitrary type , defined as follows. 
The universal quantifier  is a function that 
associates a class A of -elements with T if A 
contains all elements of the type , otherwise with 
F. The existential quantifier  is a function that 
associates a class A of -elements with T if A is a 
non-empty class, otherwise with F. 
Notational conventions. Below all type 
indications will be provided outside the formulae in 
order not to clutter the notation. The outermost 
brackets of Closures will be omitted whenever no 
confusion arises. Furthermore, ‘X/’ means that an 
object X is (a member) of type . ‘X v ’ means 
that X is typed to v-construct an object of type , 
regardless of whether X in fact constructs anything. 
We write ‘X  ’ if what is v-constructed does not 
depend on a valuation v. Throughout, it holds that 
the variables w v  and t v . If C v  then 
the frequently used Composition [[C w] t], which is 
the intensional descent (a.k.a. extensionalization) 
of the -intension v-constructed by C, will be 
encoded as ‘Cwt’. When applying quantifiers, we 
use a simpler notation ‘x B’, ‘x B’ instead of the 
full notation ‘[0 x B]’, ‘[0 x B]’, x  , B  , 
to make the quantified constructions easier to read. 
When applying truth-functions we use infix notation 
without Trivialization. For instance, instead of the 
Composition ‘[0 A B]’ we write simply ‘[A  B]’.  
                                                     
4 For details see [8, §4.1] 
For illustration, here is an example of the 
analysis of a simple sentence “John is near-
sighted”. First, type-theoretical analysis, i.e. 
assigning types to the objects that receive mention 
in the sentence: John/; Nearsighted/(); the 
whole sentence denotes a proposition of type . 
Now we compose constructions of these objects to 
construct the denoted proposition. To predicate the 
property of being near-sighted of John, the 
property must be extensionalized first: 
[[0Nearsighted w] t], or 0Nearsightedwt v (), for 
short. The Composition [0Nearsightedwt 0John] v 
; and finally, the whole empirical sentence 
denotes a proposition of type , hence it encodes 
as its meaning the Closure  
wt [0Nearsightedwt 0John]  . 
In TIL we reject individual essentialism; instead, 
we adhere to intensional essentialism. It means 
that each -intension P is necessarily related to a 
collection of requisites of P, its essence, that 
together define the intension P. For instance, 
requisites of the property of being a horse are the 
property of being a mammal of the family Equidae, 
species Equus Caballus, the property of having 
blood circuit, being a living creature, and many 
others. Necessarily, if some individual a happens 
to be a horse then a is a mammal of the family 
Equidae, etc. 
The requisite relations Req are a family of 
relations-in-extension between two intensions, 
hence of the polymorphous type (), where 
possibly  = . Infinitely many combinations of Req 
are possible, but the following is the relevant one 
that we need for our purpose:4  
Req /(()()): an individual property is a 
requisite of another such property. Thus, 
we define: 
Definition (requisite relation between -
properties) Let X, Y be constructions of 
properties, X, Y/n  (); x  , True/(): 
the property of propositions of being true in a given 
world and time of evaluation. Then [0Req Y X] = 
wt [x [[0Truewt wt [Xwt x]] [0Truewt 
wt [Ywt  x]]]]. 
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Gloss definiendum as, “Y is a requisite of X”, 
and definiens as, “Necessarily, at every w, t, 
whatever x instantiates X at w, t also instantiates 
Y at w, t.” 
Remark. Here we have to apply the property of 
propositions True to deal with partiality. This is due 
to the fact that there is a stronger relation between 
properties, namely that of pre-requisite. If Y is a 
pre-requisite of X, then if an individual x does not 
instantiate Y it is neither true nor false that x 
instantiates X. The proposition wt [Xwt x] has a 
truth-value gap. For instance, the property of 
having stopped smoking has a pre-requisite of 
being an ex-smoker. If somebody never smoked 
they could not stop smoking, of course. Then, 
however, the Composition [0Truewt wt [Xwt x]] is 
simply false and since it is an antecedent of the 
above implication, the implication is true, as it 
should be. 
Since the topic of this paper is learning and 
refining concepts, we need to define the notion of 
concept. In TIL concepts are defined as closed 
constructions in their normal form. Referring for 
details to [8, §2.2], we briefly recapitulate. 
Concepts are meanings of semantically complete 
terms that do not contain indexicals or other 
pragmatically incomplete terms. In case of the 
latter we furnish a pragmatically incomplete 
expression with an open construction containing 
free variables.  
An open construction cannot be executed 
unless valuation of its free variables is supplied, 
usually by the situation of utterance. For instance, 
the meaning of the sentence “He is smart” is the 
open construction wt [0Smartwt he], he v , that 
cannot be evaluated until an individual is assigned 
to the free variable he as its valuation.5 Hence, we 
don’t treat this open construction as a concept. 
Since concepts should be at least in principle 
executable in any state of affairs, we explicate 
them as closed constructions. However, our TIL 
constructions are a bit too fine-grained from the 
procedural point of view.  
                                                     
5 If such a sentence occurs in a broader discourse, its meaning 
can be completed by anaphoric references as well. For 
instance, in “John is a student, he is smart” the meanings 
are not pragmatically incomplete, because the individual 
John is substituted for the anaphoric variable he. For details 
on resolving anaphoric references in TIL, see [6]. 
Some closed constructions differ so slightly that 
they are virtually identical. In a natural language we 
cannot even render their distinctness, which is 
caused by the role of -bound variables that lack a 
counterpart in natural languages. These 
considerations motivated definition of the relation 
of procedural isomorphism on TIL constructions.6 
Procedurally isomorphic constructions form an 
equivalence class at which we can vote for a 
representative. To this end a normalization 
procedure has been defined that results in the 
unique normal form C of a construction that is a 
representative of the class of procedurally 
isomorphic constructions. Hence, we adopt 
this definition: 
Definition (concept) A concept is a closed 
construction in its normal form. 
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we 
deal with concepts simply as with closed 
constructions, ignoring the above technicalities, 
because we believe that this simplification is 
harmless for our purposes. The last notion we 
need to define is that of refinement of a concept. 
Basically, by refining a simple concept 0O of an 
object O we mean replacing 0O by an equivalent 
molecular concept C that produces the same 
object O. We also say that the molecular 
construction C is an ontological definition of the 
object O.  
Here is an example. The Trivialization 0Prime is 
in fact the least informative procedure for 
producing the set of prime numbers.  
Using particular definitions of the set of primes, 
we can refine the simple concept 0Prime in many 
ways, including:7 
x [0Card y [0Divide y x] = 02], 
x [[x  01]  y [[0Divide y x]   
[[y = 01]  [y = x]]]], 
x [[x > 01]  y [[y > 01]  [y < x]  [0Divide y x]]. 
6 For details, see [7]. 
7 For the sake of simplicity, here we again use infix notation 
without Trivialization for the application of the binary 
relations >, < and the identity = between numbers. 
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The involved types are: , the type of natural 
numbers; Card/(()): the cardinality of a set of 
natural numbers; Divide/(): the relation of x 
being divisible by y; the other types are obvious. 
Thus, we define. 
Definition (refinement of a construction) Let C1, 
C2, C3 be constructions. Let 0X be a simple concept 
of an object X and let 0X occur as a constituent of 
C1. If C2 differs from C1 only by containing in lieu of 
0X an ontological definition of X, then C2 is a 
refinement of C1. If C3 is a refinement of C2 and C2 
is a refinement of C1, then C3 is a refinement of C1. 
Corollary. If C2 is a refinement of C1, then C1, C2 
are equivalent but not procedurally isomorphic.  
For instance, the simple concept of primes is 
not procedurally isomorphic with the above 
refinements, of course, which are molecular 
concepts with much richer structure than just 
0Prime. As a result, the term ‘prime’ is not 
synonymous with its equivalents like ‘the set of 
naturals with just two factors’, ‘the set of naturals 
distinct from 1 that are divisible just by the number 
1 and themselves’, because the meanings of 
synonymous terms are procedurally isomorphic. 
Rather, ‘prime’ is only equivalent to 
these definitions. So much for our formalism and 
background theory. 
3 Supervised Machine Learning 
Supervised machine learning is a method of 
predicting functional dependencies between input 
values and the output value.  
The supervisor provides an agent/learner with a 
set of training data. These data describe an object 
by a set of attribute values such that there is a 
functional dependency between these values.  
For instance, a house can be characterized by 
its size, locality, date of building, architecture style, 
etc., and its price. Obviously, the price of a house 
depends on its size, locality, date of building and 
architecture style. Hence, the price is called an 
output attribute and the other attributes are 
input attributes.  
The goal of learning is to discover this functional 
dependency on the grounds of training data 
                                                     
8 For details, see [14, 15, 16].  
examples so that the agent can predict the value 
of the output attribute given the values of input 
attributes of a new instance. 
More generally, where x1,…,xn are values of 
input attributes and y an output attribute value, 
there is a function f such that y = f(x1,…,xn). The 
goal of the learning process is to discover a 
function h that approximates the function f as close 
as possible. The function h is called a hypothesis. 
The learner creates hypotheses on the grounds of 
training data (input-output values) provided by the 
supervisor.  
Correctness of the hypothesis is verified by 
using a set of test examples given their input 
attributes. The hypothesis is plausible if the learner 
predicts the values of the output attribute with a 
maximum accuracy.8 Since we decided to apply 
this method to learning concepts, we have to adjust 
the method a bit. First, instead of input/output 
attributes, we deal with concepts, that is closed 
constructions. The role of input ‘attributes’ is 
played by the constituents of a hypothetic 
molecular concept and instead of the output 
attribute we deal with the simple atomic concept 
that the learner aims to refine.  
The hypothetic function is that of a requisite. 
Training data are natural-language texts. The 
supervisor extracts from the text data positive and 
negative examples. For instance, let the ‘output’ 
concept to be learned be that of a cat, i.e. 0Cat. The 
role of positive examples is played by particular 
descriptions of the property of being a cat like “Cat 
is a predatory mammal that has been 
domesticated”. The learner establishes a 
hypothesis that the property: 
wt x [[[0Predatory 0Mammal]wt x]   
[0Domesticatedwt x]], 
belongs to the essence of the property Cat. 
Negative examples delineate the hypothesis from 
other similar objects. For instance, the sentence 
“Dog is a domesticated predatory mammal that 
barks” can serve as a negative example for Cat. 
This triggers a specialization of the hypothetic 
concept to the construction: 
wt x [[[0Predatory 0Mammal]wt x]  
[0Domesticatedwt x]  [[0Barkwt x]]]. 
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Hence, given a positive example, the learner 
refines the hypothetic molecular concept by adding 
other concepts to the essence, while a negative 
example triggers specialization of the hypotheses. 
The hypothetic concept can be also generalized. 
For instance, the learner can obtain the sentence 
“Cat is a wild feline predatory mammal” as another 
positive example describing the property Cat. 
Since the properties Wild and Domesticated are 
inconsistent, the agent consults his/her ontology 
for a more general concept. If there is none, the 
‘union’ of the properties, Wild or Domesticated, is 
included. As a result, the learner obtains 
this hypothesis: 
wt x [[[0Feline [0Predatory 0Mammal]]wt x]  
[[0Domesticatedwt x]  [0Wildwt x]]   
[[0Barkwt x]]]. 
Remark. Both Feline and Predatory are 
property modifiers of type (()()), i.e. 
functions that given an input property return 
another property as an output. Since these two 
modifiers are intersective, the rules of left- and 
right-subsectivity are applicable here. 9  In other 
words, predatory mammal is a predator and is a 
mammal, similarly for feline.  
If our agent has these pieces of information in 
their knowledge base, the above Composition 
[[0Feline [0Predatory 0Mammal]]wt x] can be further 
refined to [[0Feline’wt x]  [0Predatory’wt x]  
[0Mammalwt x]], where Feline’ and Predatory’ are 
properties of individuals, i.e. objects of type (). 
Both generalization, specialization and 
conjunctive extension are methods of refining a 
hypothetic concept, the methods that we are going 
to describe in the next section. 
3.1 Refining Hypothesis Space 
In our method we try to find the description of all 
plausible hypotheses that are consistent with the 
training data and are derivable from the provided 
examples.10 To this end we assume that there is 
                                                     
9 For details and analysis of other kinds of modifiers, see [5]. 
10 Hypothesis is consistent with the training data, i.e. the set S 
of examples, if the value predicted by the hypothesis is the 
value of output attribute of all examples belonging to S. 
no noise in the training data [14]. In other words, 
the examples supplied to the learner are adequate 
for the prediction of the refined concept.  
Obviously, a learner can usually examine just a 
small finite training set of examples instead of a 
possibly infinite set of sample concepts. Hence, 
inductive learning is applied to obtain a hypothetic 
concept.11 In the process of inductive learning, the 
relation ‘more general’ defined on the set of 
hypotheses is used. This relation is defined as 
follows. Let ℎ1,  ℎ2 be hypothetic concepts defined 
on an input domain X. Then h1 is more general then 
ℎ2, in symbols ‘h2  h1’, iff: 
∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 [(ℎ2(𝑥) = 1) ⊃ (ℎ1(𝑥) = 1)]. 
Note. By (hi(x) = 1) we mean that an object x falls 
under the concept hi in a given state of affairs. 
Hence, this simplified notation can be read as “all 
objects x that fall under the concept h2 fall also 
under the more general concept h1”. The subset of 
hypotheses obtained by inductive learning which is 
consistent with the training set of examples is 
called version-space. 
3.2 Algorithm Framework 
All machine learning algorithms, no matter into 
which family they belong, can be characterized by 
common categories which form a framework [11]. 
The algorithms are characterized by task goals, 
training data, data representation, and a set of 
operators which manipulate with data 
representation. In our machine learning algorithm, 
the framework can be briefly described as follows. 
Objective Goal. As mentioned above, the goal 
of an agent is to discover the best refinement of the 
learned simple concept of an object O, i.e. a 
molecular closed construction that produces the 
same object. Moreover, this molecular concept 
should specify as much as possible of the 
requisites of the object O so that it also excludes 
other similar concepts.  
Training data. An agent works with positive and 
negative examples that are sentences extracted by 
11 For details on and definition of inductive learning see, e.g., 
[14, §2.2.2, p. 23].  
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a supervisor from a textual base. Positive 
examples contain concepts of requisites specifying 
the learned simple concept, while negative 
examples specify properties that do not belong to 
the essence of the intension provided by 
the concept.  
Data Representation. The agents must have an 
internal formal representation of data obtained by 
examples. Plausible hypotheses are then 
formulated in terms of this representation. Our 
formalism is that of Transparent Intensional Logic 
so that the sentences are analysed in terms of 
TIL constructions. 
Knowledge Modifying Module. The learning 
algorithm is biased in favor of a preferred 
hypothesis. By using proper preferences, we 
reduce the hypothesis space. In version-space 
learning the bias is called a restriction bias, 
because the bias is obtained by restricting the 
allowable hypotheses. The agent uses a set of 
operations to modify the hypothesis during a 
heuristic search in the hypothesis space. The three 
main operations to modify a hypothetic concept are 
generalization, specialization and refinement. 
There are two possibilities how to obtain a proper 
hypothesis. The first one is based on using merely 
positive examples. In this case we need to be sure 
that the examples cover well the positive cases; in 
other words, we need examples containing all and 
only requisites of the learned concept.  
The second way that we vote for is using both 
positive and negative examples. By applying 
specialization based on negative examples we 
exclude too general hypotheses. 
4 Inductive Heuristics 
For our purpose we voted for an adjusted version 
of Patrick Winston algorithm [18] of supervised 
machine learning. This algorithm applies the 
principles of generalization and specialization to 
obtain a plausible hypothesis, i.e. the functional 
dependency between input and output attributes. 
In our case the main principle is the method of 
refining the output simple concept. Hence, instead 
of a functional dependency between input and 
output attributes, we are looking for molecular 
concepts refining the output simple concept; 
constituents of the molecular concept are related 
to the output concept by the requisite relation. 
Winston algorithm assumes that examples differ 
from the model just in one attribute while in our 
case we develop the molecular concept by adding 
new constituents contained in example sentences 
describing or rather refining the output concept. 
Hence our algorithm does not compare a model 
with examples; rather, it compares the hypothetic 
concept with information in sample sentences.  
As stated above, our main method is refinement 
of a concept, i.e. a hypothetic molecular 
construction. Based on positive examples we 
extend the collection of requisites by adding 
missing concepts in a conjunctive way. As a 
special case, generalization can be applied. Based 
on agents’ ontologies, generalization usually 
concerns replacing one or more constituents of the 
hypothetic concept by a more general one.  
Specialization is triggered by negative 
examples. As a result, negation of a property that 
does not belong to the essence of the hypothetic 
concept is inserted. Specialization serves to 
distinguish the output concept from similar ones. 
For instance, a wooden horse can serve as a 
negative example to the concept of horse, because 
a wooden horse is not a horse; rather, it is a toy 
horse though it may look like a genuine 
living horse. 
Heuristic methods of the original Winston 
algorithm work with examples that cover all the 
attributes of a learned object. Based on positive 
examples the hypothesis is modified in such a way 
that the values of attributes are adjusted, or in case 
of a negative example an unwanted attribute 
marked as Must-not-be is inserted.  
In our application the sentences that mention 
the learned concept contain as constituents some 
but not all the requisites of this concept, and we 
build up a new molecular concept by adding new 
information extracted from positive or negative 
examples. Hence, we had to implement a new 
heuristic Concept-introduction for inserting 
concepts of new requisites into a hypothetic 
concept. Negative examples trigger the method 
Forbid-link that inserts a concept of negated 
property into the hypothesis. Generalization is 
realized by modules that introduce a concept of a 
more general property; to this end we also adjusted 
the original heuristic Close-interval so that it is 
possible to generalize values of numeric concepts 
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by the union of interval values from an example 
and model. 12  Here is a brief specification of 
the algorithm.  
Refinement 
1. Compare the model hypothesis (to be refined) 
and the positive example to find a significant 
difference  
2. If there is a significant difference, then  
a) if the positive example contains as its 
constituent a concept that the model does 
not have, use the Concept-introduction  
b) else ignore example 
Specialization 
1. Compare the model hypothesis (to be refined) 
and the near-miss example to find a 
significant difference  
2. If there is a significant difference, then  
c) if the near-miss example has a 
constituent of the concept that the model 
does not have, use the Forbid-link  
d) else ignore example 
Generalization 
1. Compare the model hypothesis (to be refined) 
and the positive example to determine a 
difference 
2. For each difference do 
a) if a concept in the model points at a value 
that differs from the value in the example, 
then  
i) if the properties in which the model 
and example differ have the most 
specific general property, use the 
Climb-tree  
ii) else use Union-set  
b) if the model and example differ at an 
attribute numerical value or interval, use 
the Close-interval  
c) else ignore example. 
                                                     
12 For the sake of simplicity, we did not change the original 
names of particular modules though we do not work with 
‘links’ between objects and attribute values any more. The 
5  Example of Learning the Concept of 
Myopia 
As a sample example we now introduce the 
process of learning refinements of the simple 
concept of myopia, i.e. 0Myopia, by extracting 
information from natural language sentences 
describing the property of having myopia. As 
always, first types Myopia / (𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔  Sharp, Blur, 
Disorder, Eye-Nerve, Eye-Lenses / (𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔  Eye-
Focus, Damaged, Inflexible / ((𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔(𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔)Close, 
Distant, Looking-at / (𝜊𝜄𝜄)𝜏𝜔 x, y  𝜄 Req / 
(𝜊(𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔(𝜊𝜄)𝜏𝜔) / (𝜊(𝜊𝜄))  
Positive examples trigger the heuristic Concept-
introduction that inserts a concept of a new 
requisite into the concept learned so far: 
1. In myopia, close objects look sharp: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
2. In myopia, distant objects appear blurred: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
3. Myopia is an eye focusing disorder: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞 0 [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
Negative examples trigger the heuristic Forbid-
link that inserts a negative information to the 
concept learned so far: 
1. Cause of myopia is not a damaged eye-
nerve: 
heuristics Require-link and Drop-link from the original 
algorithm have not been used in our adjusted version.   
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[ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 [ 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
2. Cause of myopia is not inflexible eye lenses: 
[ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 [ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒00 𝑠] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
Cause/(()()): relation between 
properties; for the sake of simplicity we analyse 
‘cause of something’ just as such a relation though 
we are aware of the fact that the problem of the 
semantics of causal relations is much more 
complicated. Yet such a simplification is harmless 
in our example. 
Simulation of the Algorithm Execution 
The algorithm creates a molecular concept that 
will serve as an explication of the learned simple 
concept step by step. Each positive/negative 
example yields conjunctive/disjunctive or negative 
insertion of new constituents into the hypothesis 
learned so far. The execution of our algorithm 
begins with a first chosen positive example. 
The construction encoded by this sentence 
(see above) becomes an initial hypothesis model:  
”In myopia, close objects look sharp.”  
The second positive example:  
“In myopia distant objects appear blur.” 
refines the model by Concept-introduction. This 
heuristic module inserts a new concept into the 
hypothetic model in the conjunctive way. As a 
result, we have a hypothetic model “In myopia, 
close objects look sharp and distant objects 
look blur”: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
The last positive example: 
“It is an eye focusing disorder.” 
also refines the model by Concept-introduction: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
The first negative example “The cause of 
myopia is not a damaged eye nerve” triggers 
specialization of the hypothesis. As a result, we 
insert negative information about myopia:  
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ][ ]]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]
∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ ¬0 [ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒0  [ 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]]. 
The second negative example “Myopia is not 
caused by inflexible eye lenses” also specializes 
the concept. The resulting molecular concept is:  
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]   ∧, 
[ ¬0 [ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒0  [ 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]] ∧, 
[ ¬0 [ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 [ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒00 𝑠] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]]. 
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In this example we still did not deal with 
generalization. Generalization triggers one of the 
three heuristics, namely Climb-tree, Set-union or 
Close-interval. These heuristic modules adjust 
the hypothetic concept in the following way. 
The Climb-tree heuristic module replaces two 
or more constituents of the concept learned so far 
by a more general constituent. To this end an 
agent must have a tree model of organizing 
concepts in agent’s ontology. The concepts in the 
model are ordered with respect to the requisite 
relation. For instance, consider the concepts of the 
properties of having eye correction, wearing 
dioptric glasses, having contact lenses. 
Necessarily, if an individual x happens to have an 
eye correction then x wears dioptric glasses or 
contact lenses, or perhaps has some other 
eye correction.  
Hence, the property of having eye correction is 
a requisite of both the properties of wearing dioptric 
glasses and having contact lenses. Let 
Correction/()be the property of having eye 
correction, Glasses/() the property of wearing 
dioptric glasses, Lenses/() the property of 
having contact lenses.  
Then the concept 0Correction is more general 
then 0Glasses and more general than 0Lenses, i.e. 
the property Correction is a requisite of the 
properties Glasses and Lenses. 
Hence, assume that a hypothetic model learned 
so far has a requisite constituent13: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0   𝐺𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠0  𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
Since this construction is too specific to properly 
explicate Myopia (having myopia, one can have 
contact lenses or have undergone eye-surgery), 
assume that the new positive example provided by 
the supervisor is: 
“If somebody has myopia then  
he/she has contact lenses”. 
It means that the property 0Lenses should be also 
inserted as a requisite constituent. However, the 
                                                     
13  We assume that the supervisor would not stop learning 
process at this stage, of course, because this hypothesis is 
too specific and calls for generalizing.   
model would be too specific. If somebody has 
myopia, he/she might have another eye correction.  
Therefore, we have to generalize, which is the 
task that the algorithm performs using agent’s 
ontology. As a result, the new generalized model is 
adjusted so that the requisite conjunct Req 
0Glasses 0Myopia] is replaced by the more 
general conjunct: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0   𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛0  𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
The Set-union heuristic is applied in case we 
need to generalize several concepts C1, C2, C3, … 
of properties but there is no most common general 
concept in agent’s ontology. Generalization is 
achieved by inserting the respective concepts in 
the disjunctive way. For instance, if an agent has a 
hypothesis that the symptom of myopia is a 
headache Symptom 0Headache 0Myopia] and by 
a new positive example the agent learns that the 
symptom of myopia is an eye-ache, the new 
version of hypothesis will have a constituent that 
the symptoms of myopia are Headache or 
Eye- ache. 
[ 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [[ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑡
0  𝑥]
∨ [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑡
0  𝑥]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
Types. Symptom/(()()the relation 
between properties P, Q such that typically, if x has 
the property Q then x has also P; Headache, Eye-
ache/().14 . 
The Close-interval heuristic module deals with 
attributes that have numerical values. For instance, 
in Wikipedia we can read. 
The degree of myopia is described in terms of 
the power of the ideal correction, which is 
measured in dioptres:  
– Low myopia usually describes myopia of 
−3.00 dioptres or less (i.e. closer to 0.00).  
– Moderate myopia usually describes myopia 
between −3.00 and −6.00 dioptres.  
14 We don’t deal with the problem of defining the simple concept 
0Symptom. While requisite is a necessary relation between 
properties, symptom is just a typical relation between 
properties. 
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– High myopia usually describes myopia of 
−6.00 or more. 
To simplify a bit, we just assume that the 
requisite part of the molecular concept has been 
inductively enriched by these constituents. Let 
PoC/() be the attribute that associates an 
individual with a number that is the power of 
correction (measured in dioptres). 
Remark. Attributes that have numerical values 
associate an individual with a number. Yet, the 
situation is a bit more complicated. We also need 
information on the unit in which this number has 
been obtained. In our example, the agents should 
know that the power of correction is measured in 
dioptres. Since the issue concerning physical, 
medical and other units has still not been properly 
dealt with in TIL, our agents simply keep these 
pieces of information in their ontology. Hence, 
when an agent learns that among the requisites of 
myopia there is the property of having power of 
correction equal to -5, the agent associates this 
number with dioptres. 
The additional constituents of our hypothetic 
concept are these.  
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [[ <0 -30  [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥]]
∧ [ <0 [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥] 00 ]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ],
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [[ <0 -60  [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥]]
∧ [ <0 [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥] -30 ]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ],
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ <0 [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥] -60 ]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ].
 
By applying generalization, i.e. the Close-
interval heuristic, we obtain a generalized 
constituent, namely that the power of correction 
is negative:  
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ <0 [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥] 00 ]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
The resulting explication of ‘myopia’ that our 
agent has learned is this: 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ ∃0 𝜆𝑦 [[[ 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔-𝑎𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]
∧ [ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑥 𝑦
0 ]]
⊃ [ 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑡 𝑦
0 ]]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]   ∧, 
[ ¬0 [ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒0  [ 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒00 ] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]] ∧, 
[ ¬0 [ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 [ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒00 𝑠] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0   𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛0  𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [[ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑡
0  𝑥]
∨ [ 𝐸𝑦𝑒-𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑤𝑡
0  𝑥]]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ] ∧, 
[ 𝑅𝑒𝑞0  [𝜆𝑤𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑥 [ <0 [ 𝑃𝑜𝐶𝑤𝑡 
0 𝑥] 00 ]] 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎0 ]. 
Obviously, our agent has learned a lot about 
myopia. Yet, we hesitate to claim that the agent 
learned a definition of the property myopia. The 
example we presented here is an idealized one.  
In practice much more difficulties can crop up. 
The supervisor could have classified particular 
constituents improperly, for instance by assigning 
them the role of a requisite where it might have 
been just a typical property. Or, the supervisor 
might have confused symptoms and causes of 
myopia. Last but not least, pieces of information 
extracted from the text data might have come from 
an unreliable source. Anyway, we can conclude 
that the agent discovered a useful explication of 
the simple concept of myopia. 
6 Conclusion  
In this paper we introduced basic principles of 
supervised machine learning, namely the method 
of refining hypothesis by means of positive and 
negative examples.  
The process of refinement of a given 
hypothesis triggered by positive and near-miss 
examples together with heuristic functions that 
modify the hypothesis has been described and 
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illustrated by examples. We applied an adjusted 
version of Patrick Winston’s data driven algorithm 
for machine learning.  
The area under scrutiny has been agents’ 
learning simple concepts by their refining. In other 
words, our agents learn new concepts by 
discovering compound concepts that explicate a 
given simple concept. The method itself has been 
illustrated by the example of agent’s learning the 
simple concept of myopia. Our data have been 
formalized by means of the TIL tools, namely 
constructions and types produced by the NLA 
algorithm [12].  
The proposed machine learning method heavily 
relies on the role of a supervisor. For a success in 
learning it is important that the supervisor extracts 
from a given text those sentences that mention the 
concept in a way plausible for learning. Moreover, 
there should not by any noise in these input data, 
and the supervisor should properly classify these 
sentences into positive and negative examples and 
properly recognise those properties that are 
requisites. Hence, we assume that the role of a 
supervisor is played by an experienced linguist. As 
a future research, we intend to extend the 
functionalities of the algorithm so that it will cover 
also the extraction of sample sentences where the 
output learned concept receives mention.  
Though there is no substitute for a supervisor in 
a supervised machine learning method, its role can 
be at least partly played by the algorithm so that 
the manual work of a linguist is reduced to 
a minimum.  
Our next goal is to improve the method so that 
the agents would learn synonymous terms 
referring to the same concept and distinguish them 
from merely equivalent ones. This is important for 
properly dealing with hyperintensional attitudes of 
knowing, believing, designing, calculating, solving, 
etc.  
These attitudinal verbs are part and parcel of 
our everyday vernacular so that their proper 
analysis and logic should not be missing from any 
automatized multiagent system. And since these 
attitudinal verbs establish hyperintensional 
contexts where the substitution of merely 
equivalent terms fails, the agents need to know the 
synonyms of the learned concepts as well. 
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